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A B S T R A C T
All countries in Europe have road fuel taxes and these account for roughly half of the net fuel price. We compare
current road fuel taxes and corrective taxes, estimated on the basis of negative externalities from road transport
for 22 European countries, taking into account the eﬀect of fuel taxation on fuel eﬃciency. We focus on cars
running on diesel or petrol and commercial vehicles running on diesel. If fuel taxes were intended to internalize
all road transport externalities, then a number of countries could be considered to be on the right path already
in what respects petrol taxation. Diesel, on the other hand, seems to be under-taxed in all 22 countries. Petrol
tax increases would be in order in some countries and diesel tax increases would be in order in all 22 countries,
at least as a bridge until ﬁne-tuned policies, such as widespread peak congestion pricing or pay-as-you-drive
insurance can be put in place.
1. Introduction
Road transport generates negative externalities. These include air
pollution, congestion, accidents, noise and climate change, linked to
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (Newbery, 1990; Parry et al., 2007;
Small and Verhoef, 2007; Becker et al., 2012).1 To correct externalities
in road transport policy-makers tend to rely either on a command-and-
control approach (CAC), or on taxes, or a combination of both.2 A
standard result is that taxes are more eﬃcient than CAC from an
economic theory point of view. However, CAC mechanisms are often
preferred by policy-makers and consumers because they do not entail
visible or direct ﬁnancial costs and have a lower political cost. An
example of this are the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards used in the US.
Although fuel price elasticities are low,3 there is some evidence that
consumers respond more strongly to fuel tax changes than to changes
in tax-inclusive prices (Li et al., 2014). In addition to this, fuel taxes are
more eﬃcient than fuel economy taxes and subsidies on vehicles
(Sallee, 2010), and fuel economy standards (Li et al., 2014). Also, fuel
taxes are already in place in many countries4 and, being paid at the
point of fuel purchase, they are easy, quick and inexpensive to collect.
In Europe, fuel taxes represent on average roughly half of the net fuel
price, as shown in Figs. 1–3. The graphs show 2008 values at 2010
prices, for consistency throughout the paper. Most parameters, esti-
mates and traﬃc data correspond to the year 2008 or latest possible
before 2008.
Fuel taxes are an attractive economic instrument to internalize
transport negative externalities (Newbery, 2001; Small, 2010). Having
said that, fuel taxes are very blunt instruments for externalities that
vary with time and location of the trip and/or with vehicle type and
characteristics (Newbery, 2001, p. 6) and this is a widely recognized
fact. Parry and Small (2005, p. 1276), for example, state that ‘except for
carbon dioxide, it would be better that a tax be placed on something
other than fuel: local emissions, peak-period congestion, or miles
driven, preferably with a rate that varies across people with diﬀerent
risks of causing accidents. Nonetheless, ideal externality taxes have not
been widely implemented: they raise objections on equity grounds, they
require administrative sophistication, and there is often stiﬀ political
opposition to introducing new taxes. The fuel tax, by contrast, is
administratively simple and well established in principle, even at very
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1 Santos et al. (2010) provide a thorough review of road transport externalities and economic instruments to internalize them.
2 Another option, at least in theory, would be the implementation of cap-and-trade systems. Although aviation was included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS) in January 2012, no cap-and-trade system has ever been implemented in road transport. However, over the last few years the academic literature has been actively assessing the
idea of tradable permits to regulate road transport externalities (Verhoef et al., 1997), including air pollution (Raux, 2004) and CO2 emissions (Albrecht, 2001; Raux and Marlot, 2005;
Watters et al., 2006; Wadud et al., 2008; Abrell, 2010). Tradable permits in road transport are, for the time being, a theoretical idea, and fall outside the scope of this study.
3 Both short- and long-run fuel price elasticities are under 1. For reviews see for example Graham and Glaister (2002) or Goodwin et al. (2004).
4 Middle East and North African countries do not tax, but instead subsidize fossil fuels (Parry et al., 2014, pp. 26–27).
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Fig. 1. Petrol prices in Europe, in €/L (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Source: International Energy Agency (2013)
Fig. 2. Diesel prices in Europe, for cars, in €/L (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Source: International Energy Agency (2013)
Acronym Country
AT Austria
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CH Switzerland
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
GR Greece
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IT Italy
LU Luxembourg
NL Netherlands
PL Poland
PT Portugal
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
UK United Kingdom
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high rates in many nations. Therefore it is entirely appropriate to
consider how externalities that are not directly priced should be taken
into account in an assessment of fuel taxes.’ Distance-related taxation
instead of, or as a complement to, fuel taxes, would be a better
instrument (Parry and Small, 2005; Parry, 2008; Parry, 2009). The
feasibility of a distance-related tax is, however, uncertain, mainly due
to lack of public acceptability (Schade and Schlag, 2003, p. 43). In any
case, fuel taxes (or a carbon tax embedded in the fuel tax) stand as the
perfect instrument to internalize the external costs from CO2 emissions
(Newbery, 1992, 2001; Parry and Small, 2005; Parry, 2007; Sterner,
2007) because CO2 emissions are closely related to fuel consumption.
Indeed, many governments defend fuel taxes on environmental
grounds (Newbery, 2005a, p. 24). The undeniable fact that CO2
emissions are causing climate change has emerged as a politically
acceptable reason for having and even increasing fuel taxes.
Although Parry and Small (2005, p. 1277) recognize that global
warming is ‘the only component for which the fuel tax is (approxi-
mately) the right instrument’, they still estimate the fuel taxes that
would internalize, even if imperfectly, pollution, congestion and
accidents in the US and in the UK. This is consistent with Newbery
(1992), who argues that the carbon tax should be added to the tax on
other motor fuel related externalities. On the same lines, Parry and
Strand (2012) and Parry and Timilsina (2015) estimate corrective fuel
taxes taking into account most transport externalities for Chile and
Greater Cairo Metropolitan area, respectively. Other papers in the same
spirit include Newbery (1990), Acutt and Dodgson (1997), Newbery
(2005b), Parry and Small (2005), Ley and Boccardo (2010), Parry et al.
(2012) and Parry et al. (2014).
If fuel taxes on road transport were designed as an instrument to
internalize externalities, with the caveats described above, then fuels
should not be taxed the same amount in every (EU) country, because
the external costs generated by road transport diﬀer from one country
to another. In 2003, the Energy Taxation Directive (Oﬃcial Journal of
the European Union, 2003, Directive 2003/96/EC, 27 October) ﬁxed a
common minimum excise on fuels. However, EU member states are
still free to set higher taxes if they wish to.
Fuel taxes in Europe are not designed as eﬃcient economic
instruments. Rietveld and van Woudenberg (2005) regress fuel taxes
on externality levels (proxied by car density in each country) and ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant relationship between these two variables. They also ﬁnd
that as the share of government expenditure in GDP increases, the fuel
tax tends to increase and conclude that fuel taxes tend to be designed as
an instrument to raise ﬁscal revenues and to ﬁnance government
expenditure, rather than to correct externalities. Although fuel taxes
may have a pure tax element to raise revenues (after all, governments
need revenues to fund schools, hospitals, etc.) fuel taxes should be
transparent. Thus, the pure and corrective tax components should be
clearly diﬀerentiated and the latter should be ‘based on a careful
assessment of the relevant costs to be charged out’ (Newbery and
Santos, 1999, p. 115). The aim of the present study is to estimate the
fuel tax that would internalize all road transport externalities, even if
imperfectly, on the assumption that no other instruments were in
place. We do this for 22 European countries.5
We fully acknowledge that a fuel tax would only be adequate to
internalize the climate change externality, and to some extent, air
pollution, whereas it would not be ideal to internalize congestion and
accidents, which would be better internalized with instruments that
speciﬁcally targeted them, such as congestion charges and pay-as-you-
drive insurance, respectively. However, until these types of road user
charges become widely implemented, ‘reﬂecting all of these costs in
motor fuel taxes is appropriate’ (Parry et al., 2014, pp. 3–4), at least as
an intermediate step. It would be socially costly to wait until a ﬁrst-best
ﬁne-tuned charging system can be applied to diﬀerent road transport
externalities.
Bearing all this in mind, we use inverted commas throughout the
paper and call this tax, a ‘corrective’ tax. By using inverted commas we
emphasize the idea that although the tax attempts to correct for all road
transport externalities, it is a blunt instrument.
Ours is a partial equilibrium analysis, as we do not model the whole
ﬁscal system, nor do we take into account interactions between fuel
taxes and other taxes. We also restrict our analysis to diesel and petrol,
since these are the two main fuels used by road transport in Europe.
Other fuels represent a very small proportion of total fuel consumption,
as can be seen in Fig. 4.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents estimates of the
Marginal External Costs from road transport in our 22 European
countries. Section 3 presents estimates of fuel taxes that would account
for road transport externalities, even though imperfectly, as the only
externality that can be eﬃciently internalized with a fuel tax is the
Fig. 3. Diesel prices in Europe, for Heavy Duty Vehicles (HDVs), in €/L (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Source: International Energy Agency (2013)
5 We only excluded countries for which there was not enough available data.
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climate change externality. Section 4 concludes and presents lines for
future research.
2. Marginal external costs from road transport in Europe
In this section we present estimates of the marginal external costs
(MEC) from road transport for 22 European countries. We consider
ﬁve externalities: climate change due to GHG emissions (carbon
component), local pollution, accidents, congestion, and noise.
We do not estimate the external costs of transport from scratch but
use the estimates produced and reﬁned over the last 15 years by
diﬀerent EU-funded research projects and combine them with traﬃc
data from the TREMOVE (TRansport and Emissions Model) data-
base.6 We then use these results and the model developed by Parry and
Small (2005) to estimate the ‘corrective’ fuel tax that would account for
road transport externalities in each of the 22 countries.
2.1. Carbon component
Fuel combustion generates carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
and nitrous oxide (N2O), which are GHG and contribute to global
warming. To estimate the impact of diﬀerent types of emissions on
global warming it is common practice to convert them into CO2
equivalent (CO2e), using their global warming potential. Formally, the
link between CO2e emissions and quantity of fuel burnt is the following:
∑Q γρF=C
i CO CH N O
i i
= , ,2 4 2 (1)
where QC is the quantity of CO2e emitted, γi is the fuel emission factor,
ρiis the global warming potential, and F is the quantity of fuel consumed.
In order to convert the GHGs to CO2e we used the global warming
potential7 factors over 100 years from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNCC),8 which are 1 for CO2, 21 for
CH4, and 310 for N2O.
Emission factors vary with fuel type and across countries. This is
because diﬀerent countries use diﬀerent types of petrol and diesel. For
each country, we used the 2008 emission factors provided on request
by the European Environment Agency (EEA), after converting them
from kg/TJ units to kg CO2e/L units using the country speciﬁc 2008
conversion factors from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008,
pp. 51–52) for petrol and diesel, respectively. Table 1 presents the
emission factors we used.
As it can be seen from Table 1, the emission factor for diesel is
always higher than the emission factor for petrol when it is expressed in
kg of CO2e emitted per litre of fuel. However, the emission factor for
diesel is always lower than the emission factor for petrol when it is
expressed in kg of CO2e emitted per vehicle-kilometre because diesel
has a higher fuel eﬃciency than petrol.
To estimate the carbon component9 of the marginal external cost,
we multiplied the quantity of CO2e emitted by the Social Cost of Carbon
(SCC). There is substantial controversy around the SCC and there have
been a number of studies attempting to estimate it (Nordhaus, 1991,
1994; Cline, 1992; Fankhauser, 1994; Tol, 1999; Tol and Downing,
2000) as well as a number of reviews (Clarkson and Deyes, 2002; Tol,
2005, 2008), including a couple of reviews by the UK government (UK
Department of Energy and Climate Change, DECC, 2009)10 and by the
US government (US Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Carbon, IAWG, 2013). The values diﬀer substantially and in a study
like this one it makes sense to err on the side of caution and use the
central estimate suggested by US IAWG (2013), which is only US $35
per tonne of CO2 for 2010 at 2010 prices, or €26.4, in contrast with
£53.8, also for 2010 at 2010 prices, or €62.8, the central value
suggested by the UK government in the latest update of traded and
non-traded CO2e prices (UK DECC, 2015a, Table 3).
11
Table 1
Emission factors for petrol and diesel.
Source: Converted from EEA ﬁgures, provided on request. The EEA provided us only
with data for EU member states. For Switzerland we used the EU-27 averages: 2.528 kg
CO2e/L for petrol and 2.767 kg CO2e/L for diesel. On average, 98% of these emissions
are from CO2 and the remaining 2%, from CH4 and N2O.
Country Emission factor (kg CO2e/L)
Petrol Diesel
AT 2.514 2.703
BE 2.293 2.755
CH 2.528 2.767
CZ 2.618 2.697
DE 2.420 2.692
DK 2.576 2.694
EE 2.590 2.752
ES 2.516 2.732
FI 2.587 2.783
FR 2.506 2.757
GR 2.452 2.772
HU 2.403 2.650
IE 2.471 2.751
IT 2.394 2.656
LU 2.455 2.765
NL 2.449 2.730
PL 2.333 2.679
PT 2.500 2.706
SE 2.537 2.697
SI 2.567 2.757
SK 2.465 2.735
UK 2.335 2.742
EU-27 2.528 2.767
Fig. 4. Share of each fuel in road transport energy consumption for EU-27 in 2008.
Source: Data provided on request by the European Environment Agency
6 The data from TREMOVE, an economic, transport and emissions policy assessment
model developed for the European Commission by the Catholic University of Leuven and
Transport & $2 Mobility Leuven, was taken from http://www.tremove.org/
documentation/. We used the base-case pivots, version 2.7b.
7 Global warming potential is a relative measure of how much heat a greenhouse gas
traps in the atmosphere.
8 http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/items/3825.php
9 Carbon content is expressed in CO2e. This does not mean that we refer only to CO2,
but that we converted every GHG into its equivalent CO2 quantity.
10 The review resulted in DECC adopting an approach that moved away from a
valuation based on the damages associated with climate change (commonly known as the
SCC). Instead, the values are now based on the UK government reduction targets and the
cost of mitigating emissions.
11 Because in the EU there are separate emissions reduction targets for the traded
sector (where emissions are covered by the EU Emission Trading Scheme, EU ETS) and
for the non-traded sector (where emissions are not covered by the EU ETS), the UK
government treats emissions in the two sectors as diﬀerent commodities and values them
diﬀerently: CO2e emissions which occur in the traded sector are valued at the Traded
Price of Carbon, whereas CO2e emissions in the non-traded sector are valued at the Non-
Traded Price of Carbon (UK DECC, 2015b, p. 11).
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The marginal external cost of carbon from road transport can
therefore be estimated as
E SCC Q= .P CF (2)
where EPF is the external cost of carbon, SCC is the Social Cost of
Carbon, and QC is the quantity of carbon emitted.
Table 2 shows our estimates of the marginal external cost of carbon
for our 22 countries, using the US IAWG (2013) SCC. The ﬁgures
presented in Table 2 show that if fuels were to be taxed only according
to their carbon emissions, fuel taxation would be signiﬁcantly lower
than it currently is.12
2.2. Other components of MEC
The other components of the MEC of road transport are air
pollution, congestion, noise and accidents.
Fuel combustion does not only emit GHG but is also an important
source of air pollution (Parry et al., 2007), as it emits particulate matter
(PM10, PM2.5), nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur dioxide (SO2), and
volatile organic compounds (VOC). These substances have a negative
impact on human health (Banister, 1998; Kampa and Castanas, 2008).
Air pollution also causes building degradation, agricultural damage and
has negative eﬀects on natural ecosystems. These impacts occur mostly
at a local scale. For this reason the marginal external cost of air
pollution varies with location. It also depends, although to a lesser
extent, on time of the day, weather conditions and congestion levels
prevailing at the time the vehicle is driven. Thus, even though fuel taxes
may be good instruments to internalize the global warming externality,
they may be less eﬀective at targeting local air pollution (Crawford and
Smith, 1995, p. 34).
Traﬃc congestion is essentially characterized by slow speeds, and
takes place when the demand for road space is greater than road
capacity. Congestion costs ‘arise because additional vehicles reduce the
speed of other vehicles, and hence increase their journey time’
(Newbery, 1990, p. 27). Longer and unreliable travel times are costly
and inevitably also cause an ineﬃcient distribution and delivery of
goods and services. Drivers do not take into account the time cost they
impose on other road users, they only take into account their own
travel time costs, including those due to congestion. Obviously,
marginal external congestion costs are closely linked to time and
location, and in that sense, fuel taxes can only act as blunt instruments
to internalize them (Newbery, 2001, p. 6), as they do not discriminate
between routes or between peak and oﬀ-peak times. Congestion
charging would be a much better suited economic instrument to
internalize this externality, especially if congestion charges varied with
congestion levels (Newbery, 1990; Parry et al., 2014, p. 101) and
vehicle size.
Noise constitutes another road transport externality (UK
Department for Transport, DfT, 2015) as it harms human health and
interferes with people's daily activities. According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), noise from road transport aﬀects the health of
almost one third of people in Europe (WHO website, 2016). Noise can
interfere with ‘people’s daily activities at school, at work, at home and
during leisure time. It can disturb sleep, cause cardiovascular and
psychophysiological eﬀects, reduce performance and provoke annoy-
ance responses and changes in social behaviour’ (WHO website, 2016).
Like in the case of air pollution and congestion, noise varies with time
and location of the journey.
Finally, accident externalities arise ‘whenever extra vehicles on the
road increase the probability that other road-users will be involved in
an accident’ (Newbery, 1990, p. 24). External accident costs are the
accident costs ‘not covered by risk oriented insurance premiums’
(Maibach et al., 2008, p. 36) and include items (or part of items) such
as material damage, medical costs, lost economic output, and the pain,
grief and suﬀering imposed on the victims, and their friends and
families (Maibach et al., 2008, p. 36; UK DfT, 2014, p. 3). Accident
externalities do not depend directly on fuel consumption and fuel taxes
are not the best economic instrument to internalize them.
The most natural unit to express air pollution, congestion, noise
and accident external costs is Euro cents per vehicle-kilometre (€ct/
vkm).13 Table 3 presents marginal external costs by country for petrol
cars, diesel cars and Heavy Duty Vehicles (HDVs), which we deﬁne,
following Maibach et al. (2008), as lorries whose gross weight is above
3.5 tonnes. In addition, we assumed that half of the cars run on petrol
and half run on diesel.
Following the recommendation in Maibach et al. (2008), this is the
way we computed congestion costs for each country: EU average
congestion cost per car-km on urban roads at peak times multiplied
by the share of car-km on urban roads at peak times in the country in
question plus EU average congestion cost per car-km on interurban
roads at peak times multiplied by the share of car-km on interurban
roads at peak times in the country in question. And for HDVs we did
exactly the same but using the EU average congestion cost per HDV-km
and the share of HDV-km instead. The shares of traﬃc were computed
using data on traﬃc on diﬀerent types of road at peak times from the
TREMOVE database,14 assuming dense traﬃc on urban roads and thin
traﬃc on non-urban roads, in line with the recommendation from
Maibach et al. (2008). The EU-average central values of marginal
congestion costs at peak times were taken straight from Table 7 in
Maibach et al. (2008, p. 34).
The average of the resulting congestion cost estimates for the
Table 2
Marginal external cost of carbon emissions from petrol and diesel (2008 values and 2010
prices).
Source: Values from Table 1 multiplied by the SCC from US IAWG (2013).
MEC of carbon
Country (ct€/L)
Petrol Diesel
BE 6.06 7.28
CH 6.68 7.31
CZ 6.92 7.13
DE 6.39 7.11
DK 6.81 7.12
EE 6.84 7.27
ES 6.65 7.22
FI 6.84 7.35
FR 6.62 7.29
GR 6.48 7.32
HU 6.35 7.00
IE 6.53 7.27
IT 6.33 7.02
LU 6.49 7.31
NL 6.47 7.21
PL 6.16 7.08
PT 6.61 7.15
SE 6.70 7.13
SI 6.78 7.29
SK 6.51 7.23
UK 6.17 7.25
EU-27 6.68 7.31
12 The same conclusion would apply even if we were to use the UK DECC (2015a) non-
traded value of CO2e, which is 2.4 times higher than the US IAWG (2013) value.
13 We are not arguing that noise, congestion and accidents are proportional to or well-
represented by vehicle-kilometres.
14 The shares in TREMOVE correspond to the year 2006 and not 2008, like the rest of
the estimates and data. However, shares can be expected to be stable, especially over a
period of only two years.
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European countries in question is only slightly higher than the average
congestion cost estimated for those same countries by Parry et al.
(2014), as it can be seen from their associated spreadsheets.15 The ratio
of the two averages is 0.98.
The values of time on which the congestion cost estimates in
Maibach et al. (2008) rest do not take income into account but are
instead based on a meta-analysis conducted by Bickel et al. (2006),
which uses data collected from Willingness-To-Pay surveys in diﬀerent
countries.
Similarly, for air pollution costs, we used the air pollution costs per
car-km and HDV-km, as reported in Table 34 in Van Essen et al.
(2011), and combined these with traﬃc data from each country and
type of area from TREMOVE. The air pollution costs in Van Essen et al.
(2011) include the costs for PM2.5, PM10, non-methane volatile organic
compound (NMVOC), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides
(NOx).
Van Essen et al. (2011) update the values for NMVOC, SO2 and NOx
from Preiss et al. (2008) and the values for PM2.5 and PM10 from
Maibach et al. (2008), who in turn update theirs from Bickel et al.
(2006), who base their values on the ExternE set of projects (European
Commission, 2005) and ExternE's EcoSense System, which is an
integrated software tool where emission sources are distinguished by
administrative region, economic activity and emission height (Bickel
and Droste-Franke, 2006). As it can be seen from Table 3, the local air
pollution component of the marginal external cost is higher for diesel
than for petrol, even when expressed per vehicle-kilometre. This is
because diesel emits more particulate matter.16
The air pollution cost estimates in Table 3 in the present study,
which are based on Van Essen et al. (2011), are higher than the air
pollution cost estimates in Parry et al. (2014) and their associated
spreadsheets. The diﬀerences in the estimates between the European
approach (i.e., the set of EU-funded projects on which air pollution cost
estimates in Van Essen et al., 2011, are based) and Parry et al. (2014)
stem from three points: (a) in Europe the costs of air pollution not only
include (acute and chronic) mortality, but also morbidity, building and
material damages and crop losses; (b) PM10 and NMVOC are not
included in Parry et al. (2014); and (c) NOx costs in Parry et al. (2014)
are very low, relative to those estimated by diﬀerent European projects.
Given the relatively small weight that air pollution has on total
external costs when these are added up, these diﬀerences do not have
much of an impact on the results and conclusions. In the extreme case
that air pollution costs were assumed to be zero, the external costs of
petrol used by cars, diesel used by cars, and diesel used by HDVs would
be on average 95%, 89% and 86% of those computed in the present
study, respectively. Of course, air pollution costs would never be equal
to zero.
For accidents, the values from Table 33 in Van Essen et al. (2011, p.
102) were weighted by the share of traﬃc on each type of road for each
country from TREMOVE. This yielded accident cost estimates which
diﬀer, on average, by a factor of 3.71 from those in Parry et al. (2014),
even though the underlying average value of a statistical life is over
70% higher in Parry et al. (2014) than in Van Essen et al. (2011) for the
countries in question. There are two reasons behind this diﬀerence:
First, our estimates, based on Van Essen et al. (2011), who in turn
base theirs on Nash (2003) and its supporting intermediate document,
Sommer et al. (2002), assume that all accident risks are external, and
none is internalized (Van Essen et al., 2011, p. 103). For example, for
Switzerland, for Sommer et al.'s base year 1998, external accident costs
are 2.4 times higher if it is assumed that the accident risk of the
responsible victim but not the one of the non-responsible victim is
internalized relative to the case when it is assumed that the accident
risk is fully internalized by the users of the transport system and is
therefore not part of the external accident costs. In reality diﬀerent
countries will have diﬀerent ratios of external to internal costs, and
assuming either extreme will over and under estimate costs.
The second reason is that in addition to fatalities and non-fatal
injuries, medical costs and property damage, Van Essen et al. (2011, p.
Table 3
Estimates of the air pollution, congestion, accidents and noise components of the marginal external costs of road transport, by country, in €ct/vkm (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Pollution Congestion Accidents Noise Total
Country Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs
Petrol Diesel Diesel Petro Diesel Diesel Petro Diesel Diesel Petro Diesel Diesel Petro Diesel Diesel
AT 0.59 1.21 6.92 6.27 6.27 15.55 4.24 4.24 1.20 0.33 0.33 17.06 11.43 12.04 40.72
BE 0.60 1.22 6.99 5.60 5.60 15.32 3.63 3.63 5.75 0.33 0.33 20.62 10.16 10.78 48.68
CH 0.62 1.28 7.50 6.58 6.58 19.96 1.46 1.46 7.26 0.34 0.34 34.75 8.99 9.66 69.47
CZ 0.64 1.35 7.13 6.83 6.83 15.77 7.50 7.50 4.26 0.39 0.39 23.11 15.36 16.07 50.27
DE 0.61 1.24 7.11 6.18 6.18 17.08 2.71 2.71 4.04 0.38 0.38 28.38 9.87 10.51 56.61
DK 0.64 1.38 7.38 6.01 6.01 16.69 3.11 3.11 1.34 0.34 0.34 23.92 10.10 10.84 49.34
EE 0.74 1.65 6.87 8.85 8.85 14.07 5.84 5.84 3.38 0.49 0.49 13.38 15.93 16.84 37.70
ES 0.64 1.35 7.34 6.78 6.78 19.53 2.69 2.69 4.40 0.39 0.39 31.57 10.50 11.21 62.84
FI 0.67 1.46 7.85 6.54 6.54 17.91 4.01 4.01 3.13 0.38 0.38 32.19 11.59 12.39 61.08
FR 0.62 1.27 7.29 6.89 6.89 19.46 1.82 1.82 4.75 0.39 0.39 34.46 9.71 10.36 65.96
GR 0.68 1.47 7.30 7.44 7.44 16.52 12.95 12.95 8.99 0.43 0.43 27.61 21.50 22.30 60.42
HU 0.55 1.10 NA 2.69 2.69 NA 5.67 5.67 NA 0.22 0.22 NA 9.13 9.68 NA
IE 0.66 1.44 8.16 6.36 6.36 18.15 5.08 5.08 5.95 0.34 0.34 32.59 12.44 13.22 64.85
IT 0.58 1.18 6.93 6.02 6.02 16.78 3.41 1.82 2.34 0.30 0.30 18.02 10.32 9.33 44.07
LU 0.71 1.49 8.02 8.02 8.02 25.54 8.15 8.15 18.00 0.60 0.60 72.70 17.47 18.25 124.26
NL 0.63 1.32 7.25 6.67 6.67 16.48 1.55 1.55 1.95 0.38 0.38 26.88 9.23 9.92 52.56
PL 0.63 1.33 6.96 6.71 6.71 15.77 4.14 4.14 3.09 0.33 0.33 15.30 11.80 12.50 41.13
PT 0.65 1.41 7.25 6.29 6.29 15.08 2.60 2.60 2.99 0.34 0.34 16.60 9.88 10.64 41.91
SE 0.64 1.35 7.46 6.95 6.95 18.81 3.06 3.06 3.32 0.41 0.41 37.63 11.06 11.77 67.22
SI 0.70 1.50 7.02 7.71 7.71 15.84 6.96 6.96 5.18 0.42 0.42 23.42 15.80 16.60 51.45
SK 0.60 1.23 NA 6.67 6.67 NA 4.59 4.59 NA 0.32 0.32 NA 12.17 12.81 NA
UK 0.68 1.44 7.70 8.09 8.09 21.21 2.23 2.23 3.56 0.50 0.50 54.21 11.50 12.25 86.69
EU-27 0.62 1.27 7.29 6.89 6.89 19.46 2.64 2.64 3.53 0.39 0.39 34.46 10.53 11.18 64.75
Note: NA: not available due to lack of traffic repartition data for HDVs from the TREMOVE database
15 Their spreadsheets are available on www.imf.org/environment.
16 Furthermore, the local air pollution component of diesel may have been under-
estimated given that diesel was classiﬁed as ‘carcinogenic’ by the WHO in June 2012
(International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2012). This decision had not yet been
made when Van Essen et al. (2011) wrote their report.
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32) also include, in line with Nash (2003) and its supporting papers,
‘production losses caused by accidents when casualties are killed or not
able to work in the direct aftermath of accidents’, or at all. Parry et al.
(2014) do not include this item, as they probably view it as an
alternative approach to the value of a statistical life approach, as
suggested by Freeman (2003).
External accident costs in the present study may have been over-
estimated, as in line with the tradition in EU studies, the estimates rest
on the assumption that all accident costs are external. If accident costs
were say, 50% lower, the ﬁnal marginal costs, including all external-
ities, would be on average, 85% and 96% of those estimated here, for
cars and HDVs, respectively.
For noise, the values from Table 37 in Van Essen et al. (2011) vary
according to dense versus thin traﬃc, day or night time, and urban,
suburban or rural road. Again, following the recommendation in
Maibach et al. (2008), we assumed dense traﬃc on urban roads and
thin traﬃc on non-urban roads. We then used traﬃc shares from
TREMOVE to compute the marginal cost for the day and the marginal
cost for the night. Finally, we assumed that 15% of HDVs and 10% of
cars travel during night time, in line with French traﬃc data (Service
d'Études Techniques des Routes et Autoroutes, 2007, p. 2).
In order to express all costs in monetary units per litre of fuel we
multiply the values in Table 3 by fuel eﬃciency. Fuel eﬃciency is deﬁned
as the distance that can be driven with one litre of fuel, as follows:
f M
F
=
(3)
where ( f ) is fuel eﬃciency, M is distance travelled, and F is fuel
consumption. Table 4 presents fuel eﬃciency by country for cars and
HDVs.
The full marginal external cost can thus be expressed as
MEC E f E E E E= + ( + + + )P P C A BF M (4)
where MEC is the marginal external cost, expressed in €ct/L, EPF is the
carbon component, expressed in €ct/L, f is fuel eﬃciency, expressed in
vkm/L, EPM is the air pollution component of the marginal external
Table 4
Fuel efficiency for cars and HDVs, in vkm/L (2008 values).
Source: ENERDATA (2012), Odyssee database.a
Country Cars HDVs
Petrol Diesel
AT 12.65 15.15 3.60
BE 13.23 15.63 3.25
CH 13.23 15.63 3.25
CZ 13.23 15.63 3.25
DE 12.35 14.71 3.25
DK 13.04 12.87 3.01
EE 13.23 15.63 3.25
ES 12.48 14.96 3.23
FI 13.23 15.63 3.25
FR 12.90 15.15 2.84
GR 13.84 16.33 3.55
HU 11.90 16.13 3.25
IE 11.82 13.18 3.25
IT 15.27 17.70 3.25
LU 13.23 15.63 3.25
NL 12.31 14.83 3.05
PL 12.97 15.34 3.25
PT 12.82 13.97 3.27
SE 12.04 13.93 2.31
SI 12.60 14.89 4.19
SK 16.11 15.63 3.25
UK 14.11 16.98 3.40
EU-27 13.23 15.63 3.25
Note: The bold numbers for cars correspond to countries for which there was no data so
the EU-27 average value was used instead. The bold numbers for HDVs correspond to
countries for which there was no data. Odyssee did not have an EU average either so we
computed the average of the values that were available and used this as an approximation
for those countries where data was missing.
a Indicators “Average speciﬁc consumption of petrol cars”, “Average speciﬁc con-
sumption of diesel cars”, and “Average speciﬁc consumption of trucks”, available after
free trial registration on http://www.odyssee-indicators.org/
Table 5
Estimates of marginal external costs, by country, in €ct/L, at initial fuel efficiency (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Source: Tables 2–5.
Carbon Pollution Congestion Accidents Noise Total
Country Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs Cars HDVs
Petrol Diesel Diesel Petrol Diesel Diesel Petrol Diesel Diesel Petrol Diesel Diesel Petrol Diesel Diesel Petrol Diesel Diesel
AT 6.64 7.14 7.14 7.50 18.30 24.91 79.32 94.96 56.00 53.63 64.19 4.32 4.16 4.98 61.43 151.25 189.58 153.80
BE 6.06 7.28 7.28 7.88 19.05 22.72 74.08 87.56 49.78 48.00 56.74 18.69 4.38 5.17 67.02 140.39 175.80 165.49
CH 6.68 7.31 7.31 8.14 20.09 24.38 86.97 102.80 64.86 19.36 22.88 23.60 4.46 5.27 112.93 125.61 158.36 233.08
CZ 6.92 7.13 7.13 8.49 21.16 23.18 90.37 106.82 51.24 99.16 117.21 13.85 5.17 6.11 75.11 210.11 258.43 170.51
DE 6.39 7.11 7.11 7.50 18.23 23.12 76.27 90.85 55.51 33.50 39.91 13.12 4.64 5.52 92.23 128.30 161.63 191.09
DK 6.81 7.12 7.12 8.38 17.78 22.21 78.35 77.35 50.27 40.54 40.02 4.04 4.38 4.32 72.03 138.46 146.60 155.67
EE 6.84 7.27 7.27 9.79 25.83 22.32 117.12 138.44 45.72 77.22 91.27 10.99 6.52 7.71 43.50 217.50 270.53 129.80
ES 6.65 7.22 7.22 7.97 20.12 23.87 84.61 101.44 63.47 33.60 40.29 14.30 4.80 5.76 102.59 137.63 174.83 211.44
FI 6.84 7.35 7.35 8.88 22.89 25.52 86.46 102.19 58.20 53.04 62.70 10.16 4.97 5.88 104.61 160.19 201.01 205.85
FR 6.62 7.29 7.29 7.96 19.19 23.70 88.94 104.39 63.24 23.42 27.49 15.43 5.01 5.88 112.00 131.95 164.24 221.65
GR 6.48 7.32 7.32 9.43 24.02 23.73 102.97 121.47 53.69 179.33 211.54 29.21 6.00 7.08 89.73 304.20 371.44 203.68
HU 6.35 7.00 NA 6.51 17.72 NA 32.07 43.45 NA 67.48 91.42 NA 2.58 3.50 NA 114.99 163.09 NA
IE 6.53 7.27 7.27 7.82 19.03 26.52 75.15 83.74 58.99 60.07 66.94 19.33 4.00 4.46 105.92 153.57 181.44 218.04
IT 6.33 7.02 7.02 8.88 20.89 22.54 91.94 106.58 54.52 52.08 32.28 7.61 4.65 5.39 58.56 163.87 172.17 150.25
LU 6.49 7.31 7.31 9.36 23.26 26.06 106.02 125.32 83.01 107.76 127.37 58.49 8.00 9.46 236.28 237.62 292.71 411.15
NL 6.47 7.21 7.21 7.76 19.59 23.57 82.09 98.92 53.56 19.09 23.00 6.34 4.63 5.58 87.35 120.05 154.31 178.03
PL 6.16 7.08 7.08 8.12 20.34 22.62 86.99 102.87 51.26 53.71 63.51 10.05 4.22 5.00 49.73 159.21 198.80 140.74
PT 6.61 7.15 7.15 8.36 19.69 23.57 80.59 87.79 49.00 33.33 36.31 9.71 4.40 4.79 53.94 133.27 155.73 143.37
SE 6.70 7.13 7.13 7.74 18.80 24.24 83.69 96.85 61.15 36.82 42.61 10.77 4.91 5.69 122.29 139.87 171.08 225.58
SI 6.78 7.29 7.29 8.81 22.34 22.80 97.12 114.76 51.48 87.73 103.66 16.82 5.35 6.32 76.12 205.79 254.36 174.51
SK 6.51 7.23 NA 9.63 19.28 NA 107.43 104.28 NA 73.90 71.74 NA 5.08 4.93 NA 202.56 207.47 NA
UK 6.17 7.25 7.25 9.59 24.43 25.03 114.07 137.32 68.92 31.48 37.90 11.58 7.03 8.47 176.19 168.35 215.36 288.97
EU-27 6.68 7.31 7.31 8.16 19.81 23.70 91.16 107.75 63.24 34.87 41.22 11.48 5.14 6.07 112.00 146.01 182.16 217.73
Note: NA: not available due to lack of traffic repartition data for HDVs from the TREMOVE database.
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cost, EC is the congestion component, EA is the accidents component,
and EB is the noise component, all expressed in €ct/vkm.
Table 5 presents all the components of the MEC as well as the total
MEC per country and vehicle type. Figs. 5–7 illustrate the share of each
component in MEC for petrol cars, diesel cars and HDVs.
Although many countries justify their high fuel duties on environ-
mental grounds, it is clear from comparing Figs. 1–3 with Figs. 5–7
that the environmental components of the marginal external cost (i.e.
air pollution and carbon) are signiﬁcantly lower than fuel taxes. This
ﬁnding is in line with Newbery (2001) and Parry et al. (2014).
Also, Figs. 5–6 show that the structure of the marginal external cost
does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between petrol and diesel cars. In both
cases, most of the marginal external cost of transport comes from
congestion and accidents. Fig. 7 shows that most of the marginal
external cost from HDVs comes from congestion and noise.
3. Corrective taxes
The idea behind a corrective or Pigouvian17 tax is to internalize the
externality by increasing the price, in this case, of fuel, so that its
Fig. 5. Decomposition of the marginal external cost of petrol cars, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Fig. 6. Decomposition of the marginal external cost of diesel cars, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices).
17 Corrective taxes are also known as Pigouvian taxes in honour of Arthur Pigou, a
Cambridge Neo-classical economist, who also developed the concept of externalities.
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marginal private cost is equal to its marginal social cost. Since the
marginal social cost is equal to the marginal private cost plus the
marginal external cost, the amount of the Pigouvian tax is equal to the
marginal external cost. Imposing a Pigouvian tax leads economic
agents to take the whole cost of their actions into account when buying
fuel (not only their private costs) and thus, to change their behaviour so
that a socially optimal outcome can be reached.
The Pigouvian tax could take the form of an excise tax, i.e. a tax
imposed on the seller, with the expectation that he would shift the
burden on to consumers. The tax would not depend on sale price but on
quantity sold.
The problem with trying to design fuel duties as Pigouvian taxes to
internalize externalities is that they are not ﬁnely targeted instruments
except for carbon emissions and to some extent, air pollution.
Congestion and accidents are not well-represented by fuel consump-
tion, and fuel taxes would essentially overcharge interurban car travel
(Newbery, 2001). This problem has been highlighted by several authors
already, including Parry and Small (2005), Newbery (1990, 2005b),
and Parry et al. (2014), to name but a few.
Should we then wait until the diﬀerent road transport externalities
can be internalized with more sophisticated policies? The answer to
this question is no, because fuel taxes can serve as a bridge until better
designed measures can be put in place.
With this in mind, we now set to estimate fuel taxes that would at
least go some way towards internalizing the diﬀerent road transport
externalities. A crude or naive tax designed in this way would be exactly
equal to the marginal external cost, as computed in Table 6. However,
this method would not be satisfactory because it would omit to account
for the fact that when fuel consumption decreases because of increased
fuel taxation, only part of this decrease is due to a decrease in distance
driven. The other part comes from an increase in fuel eﬃciency (Parry,
2009; Parry and Small, 2005). This latter part does not help to
internalize externalities which are distance related, it only internalizes
externalities that are related to fuel consumption. The reduction in
distance travelled results from a combination of reduced use of existing
vehicles and reduced car ownership.
In order to take the above into account we follow Parry (2009), who
deﬁnes a parameter, β, which represents the proportion of the
reduction in fuel consumption that comes from a reduction in distance
driven. More formally, β is deﬁned as:
β dM
dt
dt
dF f
= 1T
T
(5)
where M is distance travelled, F is fuel consumption, and tT is the total
tax on fuel (we assume that the producer price of fuel is constant, so
that all price variations come from variations in fuel tax). For the sake
of simplicity, β is assumed to be constant and exogenous.
Following Parry (2009), the ‘corrective’ excise tax, tC , is then
Fig. 7. Decomposition of the marginal external cost of HDVs, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices).
Table 6
Summary of the model parameters, their values and their sources.
Parameter Description Value Source
ηF Own-price elasticity of fuel
consumption
−0.55 for
cars; −0.25
for HDVs
Parry and Small
(2005, p. 1283) for
cars; Parry (2009, p.
17) for HDVs
β Proportion of the reduction
in fuel consumption that
comes from a reduction in
distance driven
0.5 for cars;
0.6 for HDVs
Parry (2009, p. 9) for
cars; Parry (2009, p.
17) for HDVs
ηf Elasticity of fuel efficiency
with respect to fuel price
−0.275 for
cars; −0.1 for
HDVs
Equation (9)
f 0 Initial fuel efficiency Country and
fuel specific
Odyssee
p0 Producer price of fuel Country and
fuel specific
IEA (2013)a
t0 Initial total tax on fuel Country and
fuel specific
IEA (2013)
VAT Value Added Tax Country
specific
IEA (2013)
a IEA (2013) Energy Prices and Taxes has a table for each country, and the relevant
values for each country were used.
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deﬁned as being equal to the corrected marginal external cost, i.e. the
marginal external cost where the distance related components are
multiplied both by fuel eﬃciency and β. This is an adjustment for the
fact that fuel consumption is not the direct source of the externality:
only the reduction in distance driven matters from an externality
correction perspective. Not multiplying by β would be equivalent to
considering that all reduction in fuel consumption comes from a
reduction in distance travelled, which is not true. The excise tax is
therefore deﬁned as:
t E fβ E E E E= + ( + + + )P P C A BF M (6)
where t is the excise tax on fuel, EPF is the carbon externality, f is fuel
eﬃciency, β is the proportion of the reduction in fuel consumption that
comes from a reduction in distance driven, EPM is the air pollution
externality, EC is the congestion externality, EA is the accident
externality, and EB is the noise externality. EPM , EPF , EC , EA and EB
are assumed to be constant, in line with Parry (2009) and Parry and
Small (2005).
We also need to take into account the fact that fuel eﬃciency is a
function of fuel price (Parry, 2009). Knowing that fuel price is, by
deﬁnition, equal to producer price plus total tax on fuel, if producer
price is assumed to be constant and exogenous, then fuel eﬃciency
depends on total fuel tax. Following Parry (2009) and Parry and Small
(2005), we use a constant elasticity function:
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟f f t f
p t
p t
= ( )= +
+
T
T η
0
0
0 0
f
(7)
where ηf is the elasticity of fuel eﬃciency with respect to fuel price, p
0 is
the producer price of fuel, t0 is the initial total tax, f 0 is the initial fuel
eﬃciency and tT is the total tax on fuel. The total tax on fuel, which
includes excise tax and Value Added Tax (VAT), can be expressed as:
t t p t VAT= + ( + )T 0 (8)
where t is the excise tax.18 This relationship is not used for diesel
consumed by HDVs because diesel for commercial use is exempt from
VAT in every European country (IEA, 2013).
η
f
can be estimated using β and the own-price fuel elasticity, which
we denote ηF :
η η β=− (1− )f F (9)
Following Parry (2009) we assume that all elasticities are constant.
We solve Eq. (6) numerically for each country.19 We compute, for
each possible value of the excise tax, t , the value of f , and then the
value of E fβ E E E E+ ( + + + )P P C A BF M . Then, we subtract t from this
value to obtain the net eﬀect of the tax. The ‘corrective’ tax, tC ,
corresponds to the value of t for which the net eﬀect is null.20
One of the main purposes of taxation is to raise revenues for the
government. The pure tax element of fuel taxes is, inevitably, distortive,
but also needed to ﬁnance government expenditure. This is the reason
why we add a VAT component to the ‘corrective’ tax. The VAT is
country speciﬁc, so we use each country's VAT rate in our analysis. To
compute the total ‘corrective’ tax, tC T, , we use Eq. (8) but replace t with
the ‘corrective’ excise tax, tC:
t t p t VAT= + ( + )C T C C, 0 (10)
Table 6 summarizes the parameters of the model, their values and
their sources.
3.1. Results and discussion
Figs. 8–10 show the ‘corrective’ and actual excise petrol and diesel
taxes for cars and HDVs. Figs. 11–12 show the same taxes with VAT
as well. This last exercise is not done for HDVs because they are
exempt from VAT. Figs. 13–15 show the ratio between the actual and
‘corrective’ excise tax on petrol and diesel for cars and HDVs. It
should be emphasized that, as already highlighted above, these
‘corrective’ fuel taxes we estimate are far from perfect instruments
to internalize noise, congestion and accident externalities and they
can only be seen as a temporary measure until perfect charging can be
implemented.
The striking result is that, if fuel taxes were meant to fully
internalize all road transport externalities, then fuel taxes would need
to be increased in a number of countries.21 As highlighted throughout
Fig. 8. ‘Corrective’ and actual excise petrol taxes, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices). Note: The ‘corrective’ tax takes into account the eﬀect of fuel taxation on fuel eﬃciency.
Source for actual excise tax: IEA (2013).
18 Note that VAT applies to both the pre-tax price and the excise tax.
19 We use Excel to do this.
20 The excise tax values we tried range from 0 to 300 ct€/L, with consequent net
eﬀects ranging from very negative to very positive values.
21 If the UK DECC (2015a) value for non-traded CO2e emissions had been used
instead of the US IAWA (2013) SCC, the ‘corrective’ tax for both petrol and diesel would
have been about 11 to 12 ct€/L higher on average for all 22 countries.
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Fig. 10. ‘Corrective’ and actual excise diesel taxes for HDVs, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices). Note: The ‘corrective’ tax takes into account the eﬀect of fuel taxation on fuel
eﬃciency.
Source for actual excise tax: IEA (2013).
Fig. 9. ‘Corrective’ and actual excise diesel taxes for cars, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices). Note: The ‘corrective’ tax takes into account the eﬀect of fuel taxation on fuel eﬃciency.
Source for actual excise tax: IEA (2013).
Fig. 11. ‘Corrective’ and actual excise petrol taxes plus VAT, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices). Note: The ‘corrective’ tax takes into account the eﬀect of fuel taxation on fuel
eﬃciency.
Source for actual excise tax: IEA (2013).
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Fig. 13. Ratio between the actual and ‘corrective’ excise tax on petrol, in %.
Fig. 12. ‘Corrective’ and actual excise diesel taxes plus VAT, in €ct/L (2008 values and 2010 prices). Note: The ‘corrective’ tax takes into account the eﬀect of fuel taxation on fuel
eﬃciency.
Source for actual excise tax: IEA (2013).
Fig. 14. Ratio between the actual and ‘corrective’ excise tax on diesel, for cars, in %.
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the paper, fuel taxes are very imperfect instruments to internalize
congestion and accidents, which actually make the bulk of the external
costs from road transport,22 and therefore the results presented here
should be taken as a warning that in many countries road transport
externalities are not currently internalized, rather than as a policy
recommendation to increase fuel taxes. The internalization of extern-
alities could be attempted with a fuel tax increase as a bridge or ﬁrst
step, but ideally, governments should eventually consider charges
better targeted at congestion and accidents. In particular, the high
congestion costs presented in Tables 3 and 5 underscore the case for
transitioning to much more eﬃcient instruments, such as peak period
road pricing, as the resulting welfare gains could swamp those from
raising fuel taxes. Similarly, accident costs would be better internalized
with pay-as-you-drive insurance.
By inspecting Figs. 8–15, it is clear that the diﬀerences between the
‘corrective’ and the current excise tax are more pronounced for diesel
than for petrol. In some countries the current petrol tax covers or almost
covers most transport externalities, with ratios between current and
‘corrective’ taxes over 70%. These countries are the Netherlands, where
the current tax represents over 114% of the ‘corrective’ tax,23 Germany,
Belgium, Portugal, France, the UK, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.
The countries where road transport externalities from petrol cars
seem to be problematic, as they are not even close to being internalized
by petrol taxes, are Greece, Estonia, Slovenia, Luxembourg and the
Czech Republic. Congestion and accident costs in these countries are
amongst the highest in the sample, and petrol taxes are amongst the
lowest, thus yielding a highly ineﬃcient combination.
For diesel consumed by cars, the diﬀerences between ‘corrective’
and current taxes are larger because of the higher fuel eﬃciency of
diesel relative to petrol, which increases the cost of distance related
externalities when expressed per litre of fuel consumed. In Switzerland,
the UK and Germany, the current diesel tax is just over 50% of the
‘corrective’ tax. In the remaining countries the diesel tax is under 50%
of the ‘corrective’ tax, and the problem is, like in the case of petrol,
particularly acute in Greece, Estonia, Slovenia, Luxembourg and the
Czech Republic.
Finally, the gap between ‘corrective’ and actual taxes is highest for
diesel consumed by HDVs. In Luxembourg, the actual diesel tax is just
over 10% of the ‘corrective’ tax. The reasons for this are that the diesel
tax is the second lowest in the sample and at the same time, the
external costs caused by HDVs in Luxembourg are amongst the
highest, mainly due to a larger proportion of HDV traﬃc taking place
on what can be classiﬁed as urban roads. Italy, Portugal and Estonia
have the smallest gaps, yet the current tax only represents 40% of the
‘corrective’ tax.
Parry et al. (2014) ﬁnd that for a number of countries included in
the present study, current taxes are higher than ‘corrective’ taxes, but
they caveat that result by stating that reductions in fuel taxes may not
be eﬃcient in practice because their ‘corrective’ taxes may have been
underestimated for a variety of reasons (p. 141).
In addition, Parry et al. (2014) do not analyze diesel cars and diesel
HDVs separately. This is sensible from a practical point of view, given that
it would be impossible to charge diﬀerent tax rates for the same fuel used
by diﬀerent vehicle types, as it would be fairly easy to cheat the system.
The richness of carrying the analysis out separately consists in under-
standing how far oﬀ diesel users are from internalizing the externalities
they impose on other vehicles and the rest of society. And the answer is
that HDVs are paying less for their externalities than diesel cars.
One important conclusion from this analysis is that if fuel taxes
were meant to internalize road transport externalities there would be
room for re-structuring fuel taxation across our 22 European countries,
and probably in other countries not included in this study as well.
In reality, however, most countries have additional vehicle registra-
tion and usage taxes, which may go some way towards internalizing
road transport externalities. In addition to that, given that congestion
and accidents are the main drivers of external costs, it would seem
appropriate to ﬁnally take action and implement policies targeted at
those externalities, such as congestion charges and pay-as-you-drive
insurance. If there were insurmountable public and political opposi-
tion, then an increase in fuel taxes would certainly be in order, at least
after taking into account any other road and vehicle taxes and charges
in place on a country-by-country basis.
Future lines of research include combining ‘corrective’ fuel and
vehicle taxes, as well as other road user charges, such as congestion
charges, in order to understand how they could be jointly designed to
internalize negative externalities.
Fig. 15. Ratio between the actual and ‘corrective’ excise tax on diesel, for HDVs, in %.
22 This ﬁnding is in line with Parry et al. (2014), who argue that ‘much heavier
taxation of gasoline is warranted… because of the combination of traﬃc congestion and
traﬃc accidents’ (p. 139).
23 The current petrol tax more than covers the externalities from petrol cars in this
case.
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4. Conclusions
Using estimates of the marginal external costs of road transport from a
number of EU-funded projects we computed ‘corrective’ fuel taxes that
would internalize externalities in 22 European countries, allowing for the
fact that fuel eﬃciency increases as a response to higher fuel taxes. The
externalities we considered are climate change, air pollution, congestion,
accidents and noise. If fuel taxes were meant to internalize all road
transport externalities then there would be scope for increasing them in
most of our 22 countries. Having said that, congestion and accidents
contribute the most to the external costs of transport and fuel taxes are not
eﬃcient instruments to internalize these.
Under-taxation seems to be a problem especially for the case of
diesel. For petrol, on the other hand, the results suggest that a number
of countries are already on the right path, including the Netherlands
and Germany, which have petrol taxes that cover all external costs,
followed by Belgium, Portugal and France, where the ratio of the
current tax to the ‘corrective’ tax is over 80%, and the UK, Finland,
Sweden and Denmark, where the ratio is over 70%. The countries
where petrol is under-taxed are Greece, Estonia, Slovenia, Luxembourg
and the Czech Republic.
For diesel consumed by cars, the current tax is under 60% of the
‘corrective’ tax in all 22 countries. For diesel consumed by HDVs, the
problem is severe. In Italy, Portugal and Estonia, for example, that
have the smallest gap between the actual and ‘corrective’ tax, the
current tax only represents around 40–45% of the ‘corrective’ tax.
Our ‘corrective’ tax attempts to internalize all externalities, assum-
ing that fuel taxation is the only instrument used and no other taxes are
in place. Diﬀerent countries, however, have other road user taxes and
charges, such as for example, vehicle registration and ownership taxes
and to a much lesser extent, congestion charges. In addition, as
highlighted throughout the paper, fuel taxes, although attractive
because of their simplicity, do not target the bulk of the externalities
eﬃciently. Demand for fuel may decrease but travel during peak times
may not. With this in mind, the main ﬁnding of the present study is
that road transport externalities in our 22 countries are not being
internalized at present. The recommendation is that instruments
should be devised to internalize them, and a ﬁrst step for this could
be an increase in fuel taxes, until the political will is there to press on
with better tuned measures.
One caveat of this work relates to the accuracy of the estimates,
which rely on data collected and methods developed by a number of
EU-funded projects, as referenced throughout. Nonetheless, the results
set a threshold. Thus, policy makers can get an idea of the order of
magnitude and this can help them set priorities (Becker et al., 2012, p.
24; Parry et al., 2014, p. 165).
Future lines of research will seek to model ﬁne-tuned policy
instruments, ‘fuel tourism’ and equity aspects.
Fine-tuned policy instruments, which are likely to be congestion
charges and pay-as-you-drive insurance, would need to be designed in
combination with the already existing vehicle and fuel taxes.
‘Fuel tourism’, i.e. cross-border shopping of fuel, may result from
diﬀerent tax levels, which in turn aﬀect ﬁnal sale prices. HDVs, in
particular, may refuel in countries where diesel is cheaper (Dreher and
Krieger, 2010; Wlazlowski et al., 2009). Banﬁ et al. (2005), for example,
estimate that about 9% of overall petrol sales in the Swiss border regions,
neighbouring Italy, France and Germany, over the period 1985–1997, was
due to fuel tourism from those three countries. A uniform diesel, and even
petrol, ﬁnal price (and tax) throughout Europe would erode any incentive
for fuel tourism. This, however, would go against the eﬃciency principle of
corrective taxes, which should vary across countries according to the
externalities they are designed to correct. The problem is not trivial and
certainly worthy of research.
Finally, another line for future work would entail understanding
regressive impacts on consumers and competitive impacts on produ-
cers. Sterner (2012), for example, in a study of seven European
countries, ﬁnds only weak evidence of regressivity, and when consider-
ing income over a lifetime, even this weak evidence disappears. He
concludes that fuel taxes are approximately proportional to income. In
contrast, in a study for the UK, Santos and Catchesides (2005), in line
with Blow and Crawford (1997), ﬁnd that when all households are
considered, middle-income households suﬀer most of the burden, and
when only car-owning households are considered, petrol taxation is
strongly regressive. This is because low income households that own a
car spend a larger proportion of their income on petrol. Regarding the
negative impacts on producers, issues such as the structural inelasticity
of HDV traﬃc should be taken into account. Rich et al. (2011), for
example, highlight the absence or scarcity of substitutes and argue that,
in order to be fully eﬃcient, fuel taxes on commercial diesel should be
implemented alongside investment in alternative transport modes, to
encourage substitution towards transport modes generating fewer
negative externalities. These problems are important but fall outside
the remit of the present paper.
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